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The American Origins of Liberal and Illiberal
Regimes of International Economic
Governance in the Marshall Court
JAMES THUO GATHIIt
INTRODUCTION

Today, the United States is invoked less as a country
that conforms to its international legal obligations than as
an "exemplar of might."1 This has not always been the case.
The early U.S. republic of the late eighteenth century was a
relatively weak military and economic country. The United
Kingdom, France, the Netherlands and even Spain were
countries that were more prosperous economically and
militarily superior countries than the United States. In this
Essay, I focus on the international legal jurisprudence of
the Marshall Court during this period of U.S. military and
economic weakness.
An examination of this jurisprudence leads to three
conclusions. First, that the Marshall Court, primarily
motivated by the young country's relative economic and
military weaknesses, adopted a policy of neutrality in
international commerce. Second, that in seeking to ensure
the United States' commercial relations conformed to
international legal obligations of a neutral nation, the
Marshall Court played a constructive role in solidifying the
early regime of international economic governance through

t Governor George E. Pataki Professor of International Commercial Law, Albany
Law School. I thank Makau Mutua for encouraging me to write this Essay. I
would also like to thank Tania Magoon and Raji Zeidan for their research
assistance.
1. Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Empire and Moral Identity, 17 ETHICS & INT'L AFF.
49 (2003); see also NAT'L SECURITY COUNCIL, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1 (2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf
(acknowledging that the United States possesses "unprecedented-and
unequaled-strength and influence in the world.").
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law. Third, that this early regime of international economic
governance through law was bifurcated between a regime of
complete reciprocity between States and a second regime of
non-reciprocity or unequal exchange between States and
entities regarded as not rising to the status of statehood in
eighteenth and nineteenth century international law. While
the regime of complete reciprocity governed relations
between and among European States and the emerging
United States, the regime of non-reciprocity was espoused
as governing relations between conquering European
States, as well as the United States, and non-European
entities.
In short, my thesis is that the Marshall Court was the
crucible within which international economic legal norms
such as those of reciprocal or equal exchange and neutrality
were sought to be solidified as a counterweight against the
depredations of the more militarily superior naval forces of
the United States' European trading partners. However,
just at the moment when the Marshall Court was
solidifying strong rules of reciprocity and equal exchange, it
was simultaneously proceeding to produce a jurisprudence
of conquest and of non-reciprocal relations with the Indian
populations of the United States.
Military force and economic power were factors in the
solidification of reciprocal and non-reciprocal norms.
Inferior military force and economic power were crucial in
the creation of reciprocal norms since these norms were
being crafted and interpreted by the courts of a country
facing States with superior military and economic might.
These more powerful countries had, in the eyes of the
weaker United States, engaged in creating the "rule of the
jungle" in international commerce. The Marshall Court
intervened by announcing norms that sought to ensure that
commerce got safe passage particularly during wartime or
in times of international political and economic divisions.
These norms were, in effect, crafted to counter the rule of
the jungle in international commercial relations preferred
by the economically and militarily stronger States. Superior
military force was also a factor in the establishment of the
non-reciprocal regime of U.S.-Indian relations since the
Court justified its jurisprudence on the basis of the military
conquest of Indian territory. Thus, when the Marshall
Court was announcing the most liberal rules of reciprocity
in its international trading and economic relations with its
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European counterparts, it was concurrently establishing an
illiberal
regime of subjugating the
non-European
inhabitants of North America to a regime of non-reciprocity
and inequality.
This Essay proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the
United States' military weaknesses and its economic
dependency on European countries in the late eighteenth to
early nineteenth century. Part II discusses the judicial
creativity of the Marshall Court, particularly in
establishing rules of equal exchange between neutrals and
belligerents during war. Part III will show how the
Marshall Court at the same time created rules of unequal
exchange between the United States and Indian nations.
I. THE UNITED STATES' MILITARY WEAKNESSES AND
ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE IN THE LATE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

The late eighteenth century United States was a
militarily and economically weak country. Its military and
naval capability could not rival that of the British or
French. Its economy was also heavily dependent on these
European countries for credit as well as both a source of
imports and as a market for its goods.
With regard to its economy, a large segment of U.S.
federal revenue in the late eighteenth century was derived
from import taxes primarily from Great Britain. Although
France had hoped to replace Great Britain's position in this
economic relationship with the United States, it failed in
doing so. In addition, Alexander Hamilton and his followers
felt it was the United States' trade relationship with Great
Britain that kept the United States together. 2
In fact, Hamilton, the Secretary of the Treasury in the
George
Washington
administration,
believed
that
supporting France while it was at war with Great Britain
would amount to commencing an indirect war between the
United States and the British. This would, in turn,
undermine the important United States trade relationship
with Great Britain. 3 The relative weakness of the United
States vis-a-vis France and Great Britain was not an
2. See

FORREST MCDONALD, THE PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE WASHINGTON

(1974).
3. See id.

119-20
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insignificant factor in the decision by the United States to
remain neutral in its relationships with these European
powers. Congress affirmed neutrality by passing the
Neutrality Act in the summer of 1794. 4 The Act endorsed
President Washington's neutrality proclamation and made
it illegal for U.S. citizens to "enlist in the service of a foreign
power" and banned
foreign armed vessels from being fitted
5
in U.S. ports.
Thus, notwithstanding heavy promptings by France to
take hostile actions against the British, the United States
demurred. The United States' dedication to neutrality was
not taken well by the French, who felt that the United
States was being disloyal after the French had recently
assisted it against the British in its fight for independence.
The Jay's Treaty of 1794 epitomized the upper hand of
the British in its relations with the United States. 6 Though
intended by the Washington administration to have ended
British captures of American cargo unrelated to war from
the seas and the impressments of American men by the
British navy, the Jay's Treaty failed to do either. Further, it
effectively abandoned the neutrality principles to which the
United States had committed itself. Hence, rather than
affirm its freedom of the seas under which "free ships make
free goods," "neutrals have the right to trade freely in noncontraband goods with belligerents," and that "contraband
lists must be limited to war materials," 7 in Jay's Treaty, the
United States acquiesced to British supremacy on the high
seas. Further, under the terms of the treaty, Great Britain
revived the "Rule of 1756" under which neutrals were
foreclosed from trading with British enemy ports during
wartime.8 The United States also gave exclusive rights to
the usage of American ports to the British under the
treaty. 9 The Washington administration was heavily
criticized in the United States for giving too much to the
4. Neutrality Act, ch. 50, 1 Stat. 381 (1794).
5. MCDONALD, supra note 2, at 145.
6. Jay's Treaty, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Nov. 19, 1794 [hereinafter Jay's Treaty],
available at http://memory.loc.gov.
7. MCDONALD, supra note 2, at 154.
8. See Jay's Treaty, supra note 6, art. XVIII.
9. See Gregory E. Fehlings, America's First Limited War, 53 NAVAL WAR C.
REV. 103, 108 (2000).
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British at a time when they were experiencing losses
around the world.10
In response to this cozying up to the British, France
began targeting and attacking American merchant ships. In
less than a one-year period between 1796 and 1797, the
French had captured over 300 American merchant ships."
The United States was practically defenseless against such
French aggression since it lacked warships to defend its
merchant ships. By 1800, the United States lost over 2,000
of these merchant ships. 12 While America suffered these
losses at home, France was drunk with joy with victory
after victory in Europe. France now had its aggression
directed towards America, particularly with aspirations of
creating a French colony in America and ending the
westward expansion of the United States. 13 These plans
were a real threat to the United States. France's army of
800,000 men had proven to be skilled in battle and would
surely make short work of America's small 3,000-man
army. 14
This military inferiority in turn molded the United
States' response to France's aggressive actions. The actions
taken in retaliation to the French actions were not military
in nature because such actions were likely to be futile and
could lead to a disastrous result for the United States if
France's military should retaliate. 15 Congress refused to
allow vessels to carry arms for self-defense purposes and
also used revenue cutters as an attempt to thwart French
attacks. 16
In an effort to avoid a war with France, President
Adams sent a delegation of three prominent United States
political figures to France in 1797.17 These figures included
future Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall,
founding father Charles Pickney, and Elbridge Gerry, who
10. See McDONALD, supra note 2, at 152-53.

11. Fehlings, supra note 9, at 108.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See id.

16. Id. at 109.
17. Id.
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signed the Declaration of Independence. The French
informed the delegation that they would not negotiate until
the United States government assumed French debts to
American suppliers, indemnified France against claims by
American ship owners, extended a large loan to France and
apologized on behalf of President Adams for earlier
comments made against France.18 The delegation refused to
accept these terms not only because they were heavily
prejudicial to the United States, but also because extending
a loan to France would risk the appearance of the United
States not being neutral in its relations with Great Britain.
French representatives threatened that if all three
members of the delegation left France, France would
declare war on the United States. As a result of this threat
one member remained in France. 19 President Adams
announced that the French negotiations had failed and now
sought to prepare the United States for a possible French
attack. 20 President Adams pushed Congress to allow
merchant ships to carry arms for self-defense. Earlier,
President Washington had imposed a restriction against
arming merchant ships. President Adams lifted this
restriction. 21 This action caused a furious reaction by the
Democratic-Republican Party led by Vice President Thomas
Jefferson. Then Congressman James Madison called
Adams' action "a usurpation by the Executive of a
legislative power."22 Once the American public heard of the
insulting offer made by France to the United States,
popular opinion was for declaring war against the French.
Adams chose to wage a defensive, undeclared, and limited
naval war. Adams' objectives were to repel French
aggression and to force France to respect American
autonomy. Congress provided23for national defense but never
declared war against France.
In 1798, Congress responded to Adams' requests for
increased security by creating the Navy and Marine Corps.
18. Id.
19. Id. The remaining member was Elbridge Gerry, who stayed at the
insistence of French foreign minister Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-P6rigord.
20. Id. at 110.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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Fearing an invasion by France on United States soil,
President Adams convinced a reluctant, retired President
George Washington to come out of retirement and lead the
United States Army. The United States was ill-prepared
both militarily and politically to handle a French invasion.
However, the Democratic-Republican parties, also called
Jeffersonians, were still loyal 24to the French and would not
support a war against France.
The War of 1812 was yet another occasion illustrating
the military weakness of the United States in its relations
with the British. In his second Inaugural Address, James
Madison described the war as necessary to maintain
national sovereignty, particularly on the sea, as well as in
maintaining the United States' equality as a nation to other
nations around the world. 25 Madison asserted that the war
was the result of the grave abuse and injustice inflicted
upon U.S. commerce by the British. 26 President Madison
pointed out that the United States had reluctantly declared
war and only as a last resort. 27 Madison said in his speech
that although war was not verbally declared against the
United States, war had nevertheless already been waged
against it physically. 28 For instance, Madison gave
examples of U.S. mariners who were being forced off of
their vessels into foreign vessels. 29 In addition to the taking
of American vessels, the British had often failed to give
those captured the status of prisoners of war. Instead the
British treated them as traitors and deserters-quite
unjustly in Madison's view.3 0 Madison advocated for the
having
United States to fight for its rights in order to avoid
31
to do so again anytime in the immediate future.
Thus, it was argued that the United States chose to
invade Canada during the War of 1812 as a means of

24. Id.
25. See U.S. GOV'T PRINTING OFFICE,
PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 26 (1974).

26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 27.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 28.

INAUGURAL

ADDRESSES
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rectifying the abuse inflicted upon it by the British at sea. 32
A Canadian invasion would give the United States more
weight when negotiating with Great Britain. Therefore, the
rationale for this invasion was that since the United States
could not compete with the British at sea, prevailing on the
Canadian front would force Great Britain to respect the
United States' maritime rights. 33 In 1812, Canada served as
Great Britain's access to American resources as well as a
growing source of other raw materials essential to British
industry, including timber for the Royal Navy. 34 For this
reason, Madison felt that an attack on Canada would be an
appropriate response to the
maritime problems that existed
35
between the two nations.
Merchants in the United States were also fed up with
depredations they had been suffering at the hands of the
British. Merchants from across the east coast created
memorials to express their views to Congress. Mr. Jefferson
delivered the memorials' message to Congress, expressing
the merchants' resentment of the British. 36 The U.S.
President instructed Monroe, who served as the United
States minister to Great Britain, to insist on the rights of
the United States. 37 The merchants' pro-war views towards
the British were significant because they had traditionally
sought to avoid war, as it would be harmful to commerce.
These same merchants were now pushing for the United
States Army and Navy to protect their rights against the
British. Boston merchants pushed the United States to
adopt a policy that would avoid the continued
embarrassment of the United States 38and that would
"support the dignity of the United States."
American merchants also complained about the harm
they suffered as a result of British Orders in Council. These

32. See J.C.A. Stagg, James Madison and the Coercion of Great Britain:
Canada,the West Indies, and the War of 1812, 38 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 3 (1981).
33. See id. at 4.
34. See id. at 26-27.
35. See id. at 6.
36. See BENSON J. LOSSING, THE PICTORIAL FIELD-BOOK OF THE WAR OF 1812,
at 140 (1869).
37. See id. at 141.
38. Id.
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British orders were intended to be countervailing measures
against the American Embargo Act that Congress had
passed in 1807. 39 American merchants viewed these orders
as constituting
aggressive action against the United
40
States.
Napoleon further harmed American commerce in
November of 1806 by declaring that the British Islands
were to be in a state of blockade, forbidding all trade with
England and deeming possession of British products to be
contraband. This decree was made from the Imperial Camp
at Berlin. In addition, the British prohibited any neutral
trade with France unless it was made through Great
Britain itself. The British claimed this move was in
retaliation to the Berlin Decree. 41 This course of action by
the British then set in motion even more aggressive
commercial assaults on British commerce. Thus, by the
Article of Milan Decree of 1807 Napoleon declared that any
vessel that submits to British search, pays a tax to the
British, is destined to or coming from a British port, is to be
considered denationalized. 42 This took a devastating toll on
United States maritime commerce resulting in the near
removal of all American vessels from the sea. 43 In effect, the
commercial war between the British and French had a very
negative and devastating impact on American commerce at
sea.
Another furor arose when British deserters boarded an
American vessel, the Chesapeake. Eager to maintain
peaceful relations with the British, the United States had
negotiated a deal whereby it would return to the British
any British deserters. Having knowledge that the British
deserters were enlisted for service on board the Chesapeake,
the Leopard, a British vessel, followed the Chesapeake out
to sea. A British boat came alongside the Chesapeake and
showed orders demanding all deserters. In a short time, a
shot was sent from the Leopard to the Chesapeake. The
British vessel assaulted the Chesapeake with round after
39. American Embargo Act, ch.5, 2 Stat. 455 (1807).
40. See LOSSING, supra note 36, at 151.
41. See id. at 153-54.
42. REGINALD HORSMAN, THE CAUSES OF THE WAR OF 1812, at 121, 141-42
(1962).
43. See LoSSING, supra note 36, at 154.
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round, resulting in the death of three Americans and
injuring eighteen more. After the brutal and unprovoked
assault, two British lieutenants boarded the Chesapeake to
retrieve the deserters. America united in fury against the
British and wanted them to pay for their assault on the
Chesapeake. Some even desired an immediate declaration of
war against the British. 44 The events at the Chesapeake,
combined with the British decree, resulted in the President
recommending to Congress the passage of an Embargo
Act. 45 The Bill passed prohibited all vessels from sailing to
foreign ports, except for foreign ships in ballast. This
embargo was an attempt to force the rest of the world,
specifically the French and British, to respect American
commerce. The withholding of this commercial intercourse
was an attempt to pressure France and46Great Britain into
respecting the rights of a neutral nation.
This prohibition was seen as a last attempt to avoid
going to war with more powerful European nations. 47 Thus,
between 1809 and 1811, the United States stopped all trade
with France. The United States viewed48 this as a means to
prevent France from world domination.
Ultimately, by the 1814 Treaty of Ghent, the United
States and the British agreed to stop further hostilities at
sea and land. Additionally, all property and territory taken
during the war was to be returned. 49 The Third Article
provided that all prisoners of war will be returned at the
end of the hostilities. 50 Thus, through diplomacy and treatymaking, the United States sought to address its inability to
militarily respond to interference with its commerce on the
high seas. In the next part of this Essay, I explore how the
Supreme Court responded to the depredations of U.S.
commerce at the mercy of militarily powerful countries.

44. See id. at 158-59.
45. American Embargo Act, ch.5, 2 Stat. 455 (1807).
46. Id. at 163; see also Non-Intercourse, 3 WHARTON DIGEST § 319, at 103.
47. LOSSING, supra note 36, at 163.
48. See Stagg, supra note 32, at 4.
49. See Treaty of Ghent, U.S.-Gr.Brit., Dec. 24, 1814,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacylbritain/ghent.htm.
50. Id. art. III.

available at
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II. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RESPONSES TO THE UNITED STATES'
MILITARY AND ECONOMIC WEAKNESSES

"To have submitted our rightful commerce to
prohibitions and tributary exactions from others
would have been to surrender our independence.
To resist them by arms was war, without
consulting the state of things or the choice of the
nation." 51
In Part I, I demonstrated the military and economic
weaknesses of the United States in the late eighteenth
century to early nineteenth century. In this part, I focus on
the international legal jurisprudence of the Marshall Court
during this period. The main innovations of the court
during this period that I focus on are: first, the invocation
and refinement of rules of neutrality; and second, the rule
that commerce should have safe passage in times of war as
evidenced by cases in which the court found that
confiscation of private property during wartime was
forbidden. In each of these areas, the Marshall Court
helped to solidify emerging rules of liberal trade as a
counterweight to the abuses of free trade occasioned by
depredations of American ships by countries with superior
naval capabilities. These rules were eventually adopted in
the Hague Regulations of 1907 that followed 52the Hague
Peace Conference of the early twentieth century.
Though analyzing the birth of these innovations in
international legal jurisprudence is important, equally
important is observing the evolution and growth of Justice
Marshall himself; for most of these new rules are products
of his experience as an attorney, Minister to France, 53

51. This is a quote of President Jefferson justifying the Embargo Act of 1807
and resisting pressure for its suspension. Under this Act, foreign ships were
banned from sailing from any American port. Some limited exceptions were
made but the Act served as a withdrawal of American commerce from the world
in retaliation to British and French confiscations of American ships and
resisting pressure to suspend it and to allow the continuance of commerce. See
LOSSING, supra note 36, at 170.

52. See, e.g., Berg v. British & African Steam Navigation Co. (The S.S.
Appam), 243 U.S. 124 (1917).
53. According to Francis Howell Rudko, Marshall's experience as Minister to
France prepared him for the "issues raised in the cases involving prize and
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Secretary of State, 54 and Chief Justice of the Supreme
55
Court.
A. The Early Justice Marshall:Defending VirginianDebtors
Against British Creditors
To appreciate the importance of the innovations of the
Marshall Court under the law of nations, it is important to
go back to Justice Marshall's career prior to becoming a
Justice of the Supreme Court. As a Virginia lawyer, John
Marshall defended Virginians who owed pre-revolutionary
war debts to British creditors. 56 He litigated in part to
overcome the provisions of Article IV of the 1783 Treaty of
Paris, which declared in part that these creditors should not
"meet lawful impediments" in recovering the full value of
these debts that had been bona fide contracted. 57 Marshall
defended these debtors and Virginian debtor relief laws, in
part, on the premise that the treaty supremacy clause of the
federal Constitution did not entitle the federal government
to enter into the 1783 Treaty of Paris. He argued that this
treaty abrogated the rights of the state of Virginia by
allowing British debtors to recover their debts, which the
State of Virginia had confiscated and sequestrated by state
law. 5

It is important to note that in this respect, John
Marshall supported the Virginian debtors because, like the
anti-federalists of the period, he supported the rights of
states like Virginia as victors in the Revolutionary War that
were now entitled to confiscate British debt. The antifederalists also saw confiscation as a way of easing the

neutrality." FRANCIS HOWELL RUDKO, JOHN MARSHALL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
STATESMAN AND CHIEF JUSTICE 68 (1991). Marshall was appointed Minister to
France by President Adams in early June 1797. Id. at 47. For more information
on Marshall's role as Minister to France, see id. at 47-82.
54. Marshall was appointed Secretary of State by President Adams in 1800.
For more information on his role as Secretary of State, see id. at 96-120.
55. See infra Part II.
56. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
57. Treaty of Paris, U.S.-Gr. Brit. Sept. 3, 1783, available at
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/americanoriginals/paris.html.
58. Ware, 3 U.S. at 202.
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burden of poverty and famine for former colonists. 59 As I
shall show below, as a Justice of the Supreme Court, John
Marshall by contrast became one of the leading proponents
of giving commerce safe passage during war-a position
quite at odds with his defending Virginian debtors.
As an attorney, the most numerous classes of cases
Marshall took on during his legal career-over one hundred
during the 1790s-concerned suits initiated in the 1790s by
British subjects to recover debts6 0 that Virginians had
contracted before the Revolution. 61 These actions stemmed
from pervasive anti-British sentiment in Virginia during
the 1780s. Although the fourth article of the 1783 peace
treaty with Great Britain stated that "creditors on either
side shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery
of the full value in sterling money, of all bona fide debts
heretofore contracted, '6 2 as we saw above, the Virginia
Assembly in 1783 directed that state courts remain closed
to British creditors. Virginians feared an onslaught of suits
that would undermine the State's already jeopardized
finances. The federal courts, established under the
Judiciary Act of 1789,63 offered a better opportunity for

British creditors. There, Federalist judges who held an
59. Notably, Marshall had in the House of Delegates following the
Philadelphia Convention supported the interests of creditors as opposed to
those of debtors. For example, Marshall had supported provisions in the draft
Constitution that would have impeded the collection of British debts. The
provision in question here is article 3, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, which
would have granted to federal courts jurisdiction over "[clontroversies . . .
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign states, Citizens, or
Subjects." to intrude the national government into economic matters properly
left to individuals and the states. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Marshall had also
helped to draft the repeal law passed on December 12th with an amendment
suspending it until Britain complied with all terms of the peace treaty of 1793;
he voted against including the amendment. In addition, Marshall helped write
a bill for establishing district courts, which creditors had long sought to speed
up debt suits that tended to languish in the county courts. Marshall voted
against the final bill, but for reasons unrelated to debtor-creditor matters. See
JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,
OCT. 1787 SESS., passim (1828).

60. In 1791, the British government estimated that the value of the debt
exceeded 2,300,000 British pounds.
61. DAVID ROBARGE, A CHIEF JUSTICE'S PROGRESS: JOHN MARSHALL FROM
REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA TO THE SUPREME COURT 132 (2000).

62. See Treaty of Paris, supra note 57, art. IV.
63. Judiciary Act, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
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overwhelming majority of seats on the federal bench were
regarded as being more sympathetic to British interests
than were the mostly anti-federalist judges on the Virginia
courts. During the next several years, the U.S. Circuit
Court in Virginia heard hundreds of64 such cases, or
approximately three-fourths of its docket.
In these cases, Virginia debtors entered, in addition to
the regular common law pleas, a set of special pleas that
raised questions of law that the courts would have to decide
before juries could address any issues of fact. These pleas,
eventually numbering four, declared that: (1) the debtors'
payments made to the state loan office under a 1777
sequestration law legally discharged the debt; (2) that two
other wartime acts, which vested all British subjects'
property in the state government and prohibited recovery of
British debts not assigned before May 1777, were still in
effect; (3) that British violations of the seventh article of the
peace treaty, pertaining to the confiscation of slaves and the
continued occupation of forts in the Northwest, abrogated
the peace treaty; and, (4) that dissolution of the colonial
relationship on July
2, 1776, annulled the British plaintiffs'
65
rights of recovery.
No courts heard any arguments on the British debt
cases until November of 1791, when Marshall represented
Thomas Walker in Jones v. Walker.66 For a variety of
reasons, this case was not decided until the end of 1792.67 A
full circuit court, consisting of Chief Justice John Jay,
Associate Justice James Iredell and District Judge Cyrus
Griffin, finally convened in May of 1793. By then, plaintiff
Jones had died, and all of his many suits had to be revived
by special writs in the name of his estate's administrator,
John Tyndale Ware. To prevent another postponement, the
court ordered that one of those suits, against prominent
Richmond merchant Daniel Hylton, be revived in Ware's
name. Ware v. Hylton 68 thus became the new test case for
64. See ROBARGE, supra note 61, at 133.
65. See RUDKO, supra note 53, at 24-25.

66. 13 F. Cas. 1059 (C.C. Va. 1832) (No. 7,507).
67. See Charles F. Hobson, The Recovery of British Debts in the Federal
Circuit Court of Virginia, 1790 to 1797, 92 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 176-87,
193 (April 1984).
68. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
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the special pleas. The court heard the case from May 24th
to June 7th; Marshall argued his points on the 29th and
30th. While Marshall's notes have been lost, Justice Iredell
kept several pages of words and phrases which, when joined
with materials on the 1796 appeal of the case, make
Marshall's
main
contentions
evident. 69
Besides
extrapolating from the special pleas, he also discussed some
of the constitutional issues, such as the authority of states
relative to the federal treaty-making power that judges had
previously avoided. His essential point was that the peace
treaty repealed conflicting state laws prospectively but
could not undo actions taken while the Virginia
sequestration act was in effect. 70
It is interesting to note that Ware v. Hylton was
Marshall's only appearance before the Supreme Court
arguing a case. In the case, Marshall avoided directly
disputing the plaintiffs constitutional point that treaties
were supreme over state laws. Instead, he sought to
persuade the Justices that "fair and rational construction"
of the peace treaty would lead them to conclude that
Virginia was correct in this instance-that loan office
payments were not lawful impediments. 71 In a 4-1 decision
issued on March 7th, the Court rejected Marshall's
"ingenious, metaphysical reasoning and refinement upon
the words, debt, discharge, [and] extinguishment" as
contradicting accepted principles for interpreting treaties,
and held that Article 4 of the peace treaty annulled
Virginia's 1777 debt law and allowed British creditors to
pursue recovery. 72 In essence, the Court struck down the
claim that Virginia could confiscate private
debts because
73
they were the property of enemy aliens.

69. RUDKO, supra note 53, at 25.
70. See LEONARD BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL: A LIFE IN LAW 158-60 (1974).
71. See 3 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 7-14 (William C. Stinchcombe et al.
eds., Univ. of N.C. Press 1979) (1939); 5 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 317-25

(Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., Univ. of N.C. Press 1987) (1939); see also 3
ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 192 (1916).

72. DAVID ROBARGE, supra note 61, at 136.
73. Burrus M. Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War: The Origins
and Limits of the Principleof Military Necessity, 92 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 213, 217
n.23 (1998); see also RUDKO, supra note 53, at 26-30.
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B. Marshall's Government Experience: Development of
InternationalLegal JurisprudenceGrounded in the
Policy of Neutrality
In order to fully appreciate the foundation upon which
Justice Marshall grounded his reasoning in later Supreme
Court Cases, it is important and necessary to examine his
experiences in the political milieu of the 1790s.
Although the Treaty of Paris in 1783 formally ended the
Revolutionary War between the United States and Great
Britain, the political hostility between the two States did
not cease. 74 At the same time, the political environment was
also divided within the young nation as it attempted to
formulate its policies regarding domestic and foreign
issues. 75 When, in 1793, France declared war against Great
Britain, these divisions grew deeper as nascent political
76
parties adopted either a pro-British or pro-French stance.
President Washington, cognizant of the "importance of
77
neutrality to American commerce and national survival,"
issued on April 22, 1793 the Proclamation of Neutrality.78
Although there was much domestic opposition to the
79
Proclamation, Marshall embraced it.
He viewed the
opposing sentiments, especially those of the Republicans
who favored alliance with the French, as signs of
"repudiation of national union and a tendency erroneously
to equate national interest with French or foreign
interest."8 0 In essence, Marshall, who "perceived himself to
be above party, dedicated only to preserving the nation's
independence,"8 1 was convinced that such pro-French
feelings "[were]
inimical to the survival of the United States
'8 2
as a nation.

74. Rudko, supranote 53, at 13.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 53.
78. See id. at 13-14.
79. Id. at 14.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 49 (citations omitted).
82. Id. at 16.
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After the French declared war against the British and
the subsequent adoption of the policy of neutrality by the
Washington administration in 1793, relations between the
United States and France, who felt that the Proclamation
did not honor the United States' obligations under treaties
executed in 1778, deteriorated.8 3 Therefore, as mentioned
above,8 4 in an effort to mend U.S.-French relations, in 1797
President Adams sent John Marshall, Charles Coteworth
Pinckney, and Elbridge Gerry to France "to redefine
French-American relations, to restore diplomatic harmony,
85
and to assert the sovereignty of the United States."
Notably, Marshall's role, in congruence with his federalist
philosophy, was to assert and preserve both
the
86
"independence and neutrality" of the United States.
Marshall's experience during his mission to France
helped shape and cultivate his understanding of the
importance of the United States' role as a neutral.8 7 The
purpose of the policy of neutrality was strictly self-interest:
"The United States, attempting to become an independent
commercial nation, adopted the relatively undeveloped
concept in international law of neutrality. 8 8 Indeed, the
prevalence
of "intense
maritime warfare,"
which
characterized much of the end of the 1790s increased the
importance of the law of neutrality.8 9 Without structuring
the legal principles supporting the policy of neutrality, it
would have been difficult, if not impossible, for the United
States to emerge as an independent commercial nation.

83. Id. at 46.
84. See supra, text accompanying note 17.
85. Rudko, supra note 53, at 47.
86. Id. at 49 (citations omitted).
87. Id. at 56 (quoting Marshall's response to French demands: "I told [Mr.
Hottinguer] that . . . no nation estimated [France's] power more highly than
America or wished more to be on amicable terms with her but that our object
was still dearer to us than the friendship of France which was our national
independence. That America had taken a neutral station.") (citing 3 THE PAPERS
OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 71, at 173) (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 53 (emphasis added). The author further states that "[tlhe United
States' policy of neutrality toward all of Europe was prompted by the developing
nation's desire to trade." Id. at 73.
89. Id. at 69.
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As seen later in this Essay, 90 Marshall's experience in
France not only prepared him to deal with issues raised by
the prize cases but was essential to his ability to deal with
those issues. 91 Similarly influential was his experience as a
Secretary of State from 1800. Just prior to joining the
Supreme
Court, Marshall represented the Adams
administration, particularly in its protestations of the
partiality of British admiralty courts for acquiescing to
illegal captures and other practices inimical to U.S.
commerce under the law of nations. 92 He made similar
century
protests to Spain and relied on the eighteenth
93
international legal jurist, Vattel, in so doing.
C. The Later Marshall: Using the Court to Solidify the
Commercial Rights of Non Belligerents and Neutrals
During Wartime
While John Marshall the attorney often argued in favor
Virginian
debtors, as a Supreme Court Justice he became
of
the leading exponent of the rights of creditors and a
defender of transnational commerce in the face of the
depredations of American commerce on the high seas. There
were already courts in the late eighteenth century that had
begun recognizing the precarious predicament of U.S.
commerce at the hands of more powerful military and
maritime states. Thus, in 1793, the District Court of
Pennsylvania observed that it was "difficult for a neutral
nation, with the best dispositions, so to conduct itself as not
to displease one or the other of belligerent parties, heated
with the rage of war, and jealous of even common acts of
justice or friendship on its part."94
During Marshall's time on the Supreme Court, it was
generally asserted that a successful belligerent had a right

90. See infra Part II.C.
91. Rudko, supra note 53, at 68.
92. Id. at 106-09.
93. Id. at 110-11.
94. Findlay v. The William, 9 F. Cas. 57, 59 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 4790)
(emphasis added). Findlay also held, inter alia, that as a neutral nation, the
United States does not have the right to affect the confiscation practices of
another sovereign, but can forbid the sale of confiscated goods on American soil.
Id.
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to confiscate the private property of enemies and neutrals.
The Supreme Court was, however, confronted not only by
debtors from states like Virginia but also by foreigners
asserting belligerent rights such as confiscation or
defending their cargo from confiscation. As a result, the
Court came to assume the status of a quasi-international
tribunal, particularly in prize cases arising from the various
wars of the period. 95 In addition, as one scholar has
asserted, the Court in this period, "suggested itself as a
useful means to deal with sensitive U.S. treaty
controversies in a way the States might perceive as mindful
of their respective internal sovereignties, and foreign states
might perceive as credibly neutral."96 As indicated earlier,
neutrality was indeed the policy of early U.S.
administrations.97
As a militarily and economically weak country in the
late eighteenth century, various early U.S. administrations
sought to adhere strictly to the "acknowledged laws of
civilized nations," to ensure that U.S. commerce was not
swept from the ocean by the ruinous and lawless
depredations of more powerful states. 98 The challenge for
the Supreme Court though was that the rules of the law of
nations relating to belligerent rights and obligations were
not as clear-cut. Many controversies that landed in the
court required judicial innovation since they presented
issues without clear answers under the law of nations or in
the precedents of the court. As I will show, the court more
often than not decided such cases in favor of the most
liberal rules that permitted the continuation of commerce in
the face of war-notwithstanding the fact that those cases
would equally have been decided in favor of belligerent
rights with the consequence of frustrating free commerce by

95. James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court's Original Jurisdiction
inState-Party Cases, 82 CAL. L. REV. 555, 633 (1994).
96. Thomas H. Lee, The Supreme Court of the United States as QuasiInternational Tribunal: Reclaiming the Court's Original and Exclusive
Jurisdiction over Treaty-Based Suits by Foreign States Against States, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 1765, 1849 (2004).

97. "From the beginnings of its history, this country has been careful to
maintain a neutral position between warring governments." Berg v. British &
African Steam Navigation Co. (The S.S. Appam), 243 U.S. 124, 149 (1917); see
also infra Part II.B.
98. LOSSING, supra note 36, at 154.
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confiscating and sequestrating the cargo of neutrals and
others in the high seas. My analysis below shows that the
Marshall Court sought to conform the young country's
views to its international legal obligations primarily
motivated by its relative economic and military weaknesses.
Second, that in seeking to ensure that the United States
conformed its international legal obligations, the Marshall
Court played a constructive role in solidifying the early
regime of international economic governance through law.
The sense one gets in reading the decisions that
Marshall helped craft as a Justice of the Supreme Court
was that consistent with the policy of the Adams
administration and as agreed at the Continental
Congress, 99 the U.S. was playing by the rules of the law of
nations in its commercial relations with the warring states
of Europe. However, these states seldom played by these
rules and as such it was necessary to develop a
jurisprudence that could encourage resort to complete
reciprocity between these states and the U.S. as a neutral
power.1 00

99. See Jay Stewart, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American
Law, 42 VAND. L. REV. 825 n.24 ("The Continental Congress resolved to insist on
strict compliance with the law of nations when determining the legality of
captures on the high seas."); 14 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 635

(W. Ford ed., 1909); see also Jesse S. Reeves, The Influence of the Law of Nature
Upon International Law in the United States, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 547, 556-57
(1909).
100. For example, Lossing notes that a French decree of December 17, 1807
promulgated in response to British decrees in turn sparked similar decrees from
Spain and Holland. LOSSING, supra note 36, at 154. As a result, the commerce of
the United States was "swept from the ocean" within a few months, even
though it had been conducted "in strict accordance with the acknowledged laws
of civilized nations." Id. As a result, Lossing notes that the United States was
utterly unable, by any power it then possessed, to resist the robbers
upon the great highway of nations [and] the independence of the
republic had no actual record. It had been theoretically declared on
parchment a quarter of a century before, but the nation and its
interests were now as much subservient to British orders in council
and French imperial decrees as when George the Third sent governors
to the colonies of which it was composed ....
Id. Most importantly, Lossing argues that "trade between the U.S. and the
European possessions of Great Britain were placed on a footing of perfect
reciprocity, but no concessions could be obtained as to the trade of the West
Indies [by the Jay Treaty of 1794]." Id. at 150.
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I want to begin this discussion with Chief Justice
Marshall's 1801 decision in Talbot v. Seeman.' 01 The
following is the background to this case. In the 1790s,
France commissioned its war vessels to seize certain U.S.
ships. A French Executive Directory also permitted the
seizure of any ship containing any item of English
manufacture.10 2 This led to the United States' first quasiwar. In retaliation to French privateering, 10 3 Congress
authorized the capture of French military vessels 10 4 and the
seizure of French cargo. 10 5 While the Congressional acts
gave American vessels the right to seize French property,
the laws were not unfettered 06 and contained a number of
restrictions regarding the nature of property to be
confiscated. 0 7 One act provided that aliens of hostile
nations could depart the United States with their property
intact. 0 8 Talbot v. Seeman involved the capture, authorized
by the foregoing congressional legislation, of an English
vessel that had been privateered under the authority of the
French directory. The captor of the French commandeered
vessel sought payment of salvage charges. Hence, in Talbot,
Marshall and his fellow justices confronted the novel and

101. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 6 (1801).
102. See Law Which Determines the Character of Vessels from Their Cargo,
Especially Those Loaded With English Merchandise, 29 Nivose an 6 (January
18, 1798), in Collection Complete, d6crets, ordonnances, r6glements et avis du
Counseil d'Etat (Duvergier & Bocquet) [Duv. & Boc.], 1825, p. 214.
103. See Talbot, 5 U.S. at 6.
104. See Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 60, §§ 1-2, 1 Stat. 572, 572 (providing
authority for the defense of the merchant vessels of the United States against
French depredations).
105. See Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 2, § 6, 1 Stat. 613, 615-16 (providing
further suspension of the commercial intercourse between the United States
and France, and the dependencies thereof).
106. See Fehlings, supra note 9, at 111. Congress specifically withheld the
right to prey upon unarmed French vessels in fear of an all-out war between the
French and the United States. The United States' reluctance to authorize
seizure of unarmed French vessels was less a product of enlightened thinking
and more the product of America's fear of an all-out war and possible French
invasion. See id.
107. See Act of Feb. 9, 1799, ch. 94, 50 Stat. 613 (providing further
suspension of the commercial intercourse between the United States and
France, and the dependencies thereof).
108. See id. at 615; JAMES KENT, 1 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 132
(1826).
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unsettled question under the law of nations whether recaptured neutrals were liable for salvage. 109 The neutrality
of the vessel was not in question as it had sailed from
Hamburg, and Hamburg and France were neutrals to each
other-unlike with the hostile relations of the French and
the English and both of these countries and the United
States throughout the late eighteenth to early nineteenth
century.
Marshall and his fellow justices could well have
answered this question of whether salvage was payable in
one of several ways. They could have placed themselves in
the position of a French admiralty court; they could have
determined the case as if it was regulated by congressional
legislation authorizing defense or reprisals against French
vessels depredating U.S. commerce or they could have
decided that the case had to be determined under the laws
of war which were effectively the law of nations. All these
alternatives placed the Court in the difficult position of
having to decide on a question arising out of France's
superior naval capabilities-either way the question
implied was whether French privateering was permissible
or a derogation of either French or U.S. law or of the law of
nations.
The cautious manner in which Marshall asserted what
Congress authorized is evident in the following quote:
The substantial question here is, whether the case of the Amelia
(the captured vessel under French command) is a casus-belliwhether she was an object of that limited war. The kind of war
which existed was a war against all French force found upon the
ocean, to seize
it and bring it in, that it might not injure our
1 10
commerce.

Marshall frames the war as one not against France as
such-but rather upon such French force as had injured
U.S. commerce. In fact, Marshall goes on to distinguish
between the object of destroying French armed force and
French property. Marshall argues the object of the war was
not to destroy French property. By arguing as such,
109. Justice Marshall asserted years later in The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9
Cranch) 388, 423 (1815), that "[elven in the case of salvage ... no fixed rule is
prescribed by the law of nations." Id.
110. Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 9 (1801).
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Marshall is able to argue that it "made no difference in
'
whom the absolute [title] property of the vessel was."111
This is a crucial distinction since it lays down the boundary
between war and commerce-war could be severed from
commerce. In other words, the belligerent character of those
privateering or commanding a vessel did not automatically
infuse the character of the cargo. The character of the
vessel's cargo was distinguishable from the hostile
command of a vessel. The recapture of the vessel from
France-the object of the limited war-did not interfere
property of the neutral owner of the
with the title to the
112
cargo in the vessel.
Further Marshall was careful in answering the
question of whether the vessel's capture by France was
justifiable by noting that if France had violated the law of
nations, this gave the United States no justification for
violating this law by re-taking the privateered vessel.11 3 In
any event, Marshall justified the retaking of the vessel by
the United States on the basis that it was a neutral vessel
that recaptures are
captured by a belligerent, 114 and further
"one of the incidents of war."115 Marshall defends
jurisdiction over the case on the view that federal courts
had jurisdiction to determine whether the capture, recapture and payment of salvage on re-capture were due
under the laws of war."1 6 In responding to the view that the
law of nations only allowed the United States to protest
French privateering and no more, Marshall said that it is
only after having failed in its protests or its remonstrates
against this conduct that the United States had authorized
"limited hostilities" against France." 7 Thus, according to
Marshall, the "respect due to France is totally unconnected
with the danger in which her laws had placed the
Amelia.""l 8 Thus, the danger placed on the Amelia,

111. Id.
112. See id.

113. Id. at 22.
114. Id. at 32, 36.

115. Id. at 42.
116. Id. at 36.
117. Id. at 41.
118. Id. at 40.
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according to Marshall, was what would determine whether
salvage was payable under the law of nations. 119 Marshall
was of course not unaware of the ruinous nature of French
depredations of U.S. commerce. As he noted:
Much has been said about the general conduct of France and
England on the seas, and it has been urged that the course of the
latter has been still more injurious than that of the former. That is
a consideration on to be taken up in this cause. Animadversions on
either, in the present case, would be considered extremely
unbecoming the judges of this court, who have only to enquire
what was the real danger in which the laws of one of the countries
placed the Amelia, and from which she has been freed by her recapture. 120

Thus, by finding that the hostilities between the United
States and France justified the recapture of the Amelia,
Marshall placed the question of France's sovereignty and
independence1 21 not on the alter of a victor justifying it as
the spoils of war, but rather as justified by the state of
hostilities between France and the United States. In
essence, Marshall adroitly declined to frame the issue of the
vessel's recapture as one involving the superiority of the
United States over France. Ultimately, Marshall finds
(without the citation of any authorities) that since the
Amelia had been placed in "real 122
and imminent" danger, her
captors were entitled to salvage.
The next case I want to discuss to illustrate how Chief
Justice Marshall helped in the solidification of liberal rules
of international commerce is The Nereide.123 The issue in
The Nereide was whether war gives a belligerent the right
to condemn, capture and confiscate the goods of a neutral or
friend if carried in the armed vessel of an enemy. Justice
Marshall took the opportunity to make the case for the
expansive rights of neutrals during wartime. According to

119. Id. at 41.
120. Id.
121. On the part of France, it had been urged that "France is an
independent nation, entitled to the benefits of the law of the law of nations; and
further that if she has violated them, we ought not to violate them also, but
ought to remonstrate against such misconduct." Id. at 40.
122. Id. at 41-42.
123. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388 (1815).
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Marshall, armed neutrality had effected "a great revolution
in the law of nations.' 1 24 His observation that it was a
maxim of the law of nations that "free ships should make
free goods" became the basis of his conclusion that the
converse maxim was equally true-that "a neutral may
lawfully put his goods on board a ship for conveyance on the
ocean."'125 He even concluded that this rule was "universally
recognized as the original rule of the law of nations"' 26 that
dated back into antiquity 127 and he could find no writers
contradicting it. 128
In refuting that the right of a belligerent to search a
neutral vessel was superior to the right of a neutral to carry
cargo in a belligerent's vessel, Marshall asked:
Is it a substantive and independent right wantonly, and in the
pride of power, to vex and harass neutral commerce, because there
is a capacity to do so? Or to indulge the idle and mischievous
curiosity of looking into neutral trade? Or the assumption of a
right to control it? If it be such a substantive and independent
right, it would be better that cargoes should be inspected in port
of the vessel, or that belligerent licenses should
before the sailing
29
be procured.1

This revealing passage suggests Justice Marshall's
conclusion that the hostile character of a vessel does not
attach to the goods of a neutral on board. According to
Marshall, it matters not that the vessel is a belligerent one
or that it is armed, since the goal of the neutral is the
transportation of their goods which is permissible as long as
the neutral does not participate in arming the vessel.' 30 He
even goes further to observe that if the belligerent vessel
resisted the right of the enemy to search the vessel, this did
31
not affect the neutral character of the goods on board.'

124. Id. at 420.
125. Id. at 425.
126. Id.

127. Id. at 426.
128. Id.

129. Id. at 427.
130. Id. at 428.
131. Id. at 429-30.
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to
Thus, a neutral in this position only exposes themselves
"capture and detention, but not to condemnation."' 132
Although Justice Marshall disavowed using the power
of the Court to "tread the devious and intricate path of
politics,"'1 33 Justice Johnson, who agreed with him,
nevertheless singled out Spain as the only "civilized nation"
that had declined to "unequivocally acknowledge" this right
of neutrals. 134 Justice Johnson went further to conclude
that even if Spain had adopted a different doctrine, "the
practice of one nation, and that one not the most
enlightened or commercial, ought not to be permitted to
control the law of the world."'135 Both Justice Marshall's and
Justice Johnson's opinions in The Nereide disclose their bias
in favor of open commerce and against doctrines that would
constrain the rights of neutrals during war to engage in
trade. Thus even while disavowing a political role for the
court in making rules, which he identified as a legislative
function, 136 or in sorting out the political differences
between warring belligerents, Justice Johnson too
participated in solidifying the announced policy of various
U.S. administrations in favor of neutral commerce at a time
of U.S. military and economic weakness in relation to her
trading partners. 137
While Justices Marshall and Johnson were unequivocal
in announcing. that belligerents had no right to condemn
without compensation the goods of a neutral on board a
belligerent vessel, Justice Story found little support for it in
the law of nations or in "the elaborate treatises of Grotius,
or Puffendorf, or Vattel."'138 For Justice Story, "modern
commerce" had raised many intricate questions for prize

132. Id. at 432.
133. Id. at 423.
134. Id. at 433.
135. Id. at 434.
136. Id. at 435.
137. Notably, Marshall praised the "talents and virtues which adorned the
cabinet of that day, on the patient fortitude with which it resisted the
intemperate violence with which it was assailed, on the firmness with which it
maintained those principles which its sense of duty prescribe . . . [and] on the
wisdom of the rules it adopted." Id. at 422.
138. Id. at 437.
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tribunals for which there are no clear rules. 139 After parsing
through the cases and the law, Justice Story concluded
that the act of sailing under belligerent or neutral convoy is of
itself a violation of neutrality, and the ship and cargo if caught in
delicto are justly confiscable; and further, that if resistance be
necessary, as in my opinion it is not, to perfect the offence, still
that the resistance of
the convoy is to all purposes the resistance of
140
the associated fleet.

That Justices Marshall and Johnson, on the one hand, and
Justice Story on the other, could arrive at such
contradictory conclusions illustrates one of my central
theses-that the law of nations on the questions in prize
cases of the late eighteenth century were often novel and
that the Marshall court played a crucial role in solidifying
the emerging norms.
Perhaps no other statement in Justice Story's dissent is
more telling than his observation that if the rule his
brethren were espousing was adopted, "[i]t would strip from
the conqueror all the fruits of victory, and lay them at the
feet of those whose singular merit would consist in evading
his rights, if not collusively in aiding his enemy."'141 For
Justice Story, the rights of victorious belligerents to
essentially condemn cargo of neutrals in belligerent vessels
prevailed over the "false and hollow neutrality" of the rule
that Justices Marshall and Johnson espoused in their
opinion. Such false and hollow neutrality would in turn be
"more injurious than the most active warfare"'142 much to
the "dismay and ruin of inferior maritime powers."'14 3 The

reason, according
to
Justice
Story, that
the
Marshall/Johnson rule would be more ruinous to "inferior
maritime powers" was that it would swallow the right of
search and as such allow belligerents "to keep up
armaments of incalculable
size" under the disguise of
14 4
carrying a neutrals goods.

139. Id. at 438.

140. Id. at 445.
141. Id. at 449.
142. Id.
143. Id.

144. Id. at 448-49.
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Clearly then, the ability of neutrals, or inferior
maritime powers as Justice Story referred to them, was a
consideration in the outcome of The Nereide. This is
unsurprising as late eighteenth to early nineteenth century
U.S. administrations were committed to neutrality in the
face of the depredations of U.S. commerce by the maritime
powers of the period. My point is that Justice Marshall
contributed to the then emerging rules of liberal commerce
even when it seemed that the espousal of such rules could
not be easily reconciled with "the privileges of an
145
inoffensive neutral."'
Justice Marshall continued his adherence to the policy
of neutrality by upholding the rights of neutrals in a series
of other cases arising from the Quasi-War with France. For
example, in Maley v. Shattuck, 146 William Maley, the
commander of a public armed vessel belonging to the
government of the United States took as prize a vessel
belonging to Jared Shattuck, a U.S.-born merchant who
was now a subject of the neutral state Denmark. 147 Justice
Marshall reiterated the general rule that "a vessel libeled
as enemy's property is condemned as prize, if she act in
such a manner as to forfeit the protection to which she is
entitled by her neutral character."'148 Nonetheless,
Marshall, in scrutinizing the evidence, determined that
Maley did not have sufficient cause to justify seizure, and
therefore assessed damages against Maley. 149
In Little v. Barreme, 50 two U.S. vessels captured a
Danish vessel near Hispaniola pursuant to a nonintercourse law passed by Congress in 1799, whose purpose
was to proscribe maritime commerce between the United
States and France.' 5 ' The act, in short, provided that a ship
owned, hired, or employed by a citizen of the United States
was prohibited from proceeding to any French port and, if
such vessel were discovered, it would be subject to

145. Id. at 454 (Story, J., concurring).
146. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 458 (1806); see also RUDKO, supranote 53, at 71.
147. Maley, 7 U.S. at 459.
148. Id. at 487.
149. Id. at 490.
150. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804); see also RUDKO, supranote 53, at 71.
151. 6 U.S. at 170.
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seizure. 152 Further, the act empowered the President of the
United States to instruct public armed vessels to stop and
examine any such vessel upon suspicion and, if warranted,
seizure of the vessel. 153 The district court, which denied
damages, held that the captors did not provide "sufficient
proof to bring this vessel and cargo so far within the
provisions of these statutes as to incur a forfeiture
thereof."'154 Ultimately Justice Marshall affirmed the
decision of the district
court and thereby reinforced the
1 55
rights of neutrals.
Also, in Sands v. Knox,' 56 a resident of the United
States owned a vessel, the Juno. 57 The vessel proceeded
from Connecticut to St. Croix, which was under the power
of Denmark-a neutral state. 58 At this point the vessel was
sold to a Danish subject. The vessel then proceeded to the
French-governed St. Domingo before returning to the
United States. 5 9 Pursuant to the non-intercourse law, the
customs collector in New York seized and detained the
vessel. 160 Rejecting arguments, which interpreted the nonintercourse law strictly so as to condone the seizure, Justice
Marshall, in upholding the rights of neutrals, held that the
non-intercourse law "did not intend to affect the sale of
vessels of the United States, or to impose any disability on
the vessel, after bona fide sale and transfer to a
foreigner."161
As Frances Howell Rudko summarizes:

152. Id.
153. Id. at 171.
154. Id. at 172.

155. Id. at 178. Justice Marshall, in affirming the district court's decision,
stated: "Of consequence, however strong the circumstances might be, which
induced Captain Little to suspect [the Danish vessel] to be an American vessel,
they could not excuse the detention of her, since he would not have been
authorized to detain her had she been really American." Id.
156. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 499 (1806); see also Rudko, supra note 53, at 71.
157. 7 U.S. at 499.

158. Id. at 500.
159. Id. at 499-500.
160. Id. at 499.
161. Id. at 503.
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These cases arising from the Quasi-War illustrate that Marshall...
construed the law to effect the rights of neutrals. He was aware...
that search and seizure was a right to be exercised only on
belligerent goods and vessels. By objectively allowing damages, he
helped to police a practice subject to abuse. In this way, he
continued to protest the violation of neutral rights. 16 2

I would also like to credit or at least associate Justice
Marshall with endorsing the innovation in the rules of war
that where private property belonging to a national of an
enemy state is within the other belligerent state's territory,
it does not become automatically extinguished by the
conquest. Instead, as Justice Marshall held in Brown v.
United States,163 such property is regarded as being held in
suspension, pending its return to its owner upon cessation
of hostilities. Marshall's strong stance against a victorious
belligerent's right to confiscate the private property of the
nationals of an enemy state is evidenced by his assertion in
Brown v. United States that the "practice of forbearing to
seize and confiscate debts and credits" is universally
received and that if confiscated, such debts and credits
revive to their owner "on the restoration of peace."' 164 This
principle was later followed in British courts. In one case,
the Chancery Division held "it is a familiar principle of

162. Rudko, supra note 53, at 72.
163. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814).

164. Id. at 427. In a more forthright statement of the principle, Marshall

observed that the "proposition that a declaration of war does not in itself enact
a confiscation of the property of the enemy within the territory of the
belligerent, is believed to be entirely free from doubt." Id. at 127. However,
Marshall conceded that war gives a sovereign the "full right to take the persons
and confiscate the property of the enemy," but that this "rigid rule" had been
moderated by "the humane and wise policy of modern times." Id. at 122-23. By
contrast, Justice Story dissented, arguing that while mere declaration of war
did not ipso facto operate as a confiscation of the property of enemy aliens, such
property is liable to confiscation "at the discretion of the sovereign power having
the conduct and execution of the war" and that the law of nations "is resorted to
merely as a limitation of this discretion, not as conferring authority to exercise
it." Id. at 154 (Story, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall appeared to have affirmed
the modern rule prohibiting confiscation under the law of nations, and the
sovereign power to confiscate enemy property. See id.; see also United States v.
Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 51 (1833) (affirming the rule against
confiscation under the law of nations unambiguously).

2006]

LIBERAL AND ILLIBERAL REGIMES

795

English law that the outbreak of165
war effects no confiscation
or forfeiture of enemy property."
It is, however, only fair to observe that the Supreme
Court's embrace of broader rights in favor of commerce and
the consequential contraction of belligerent rights pre-dated
Marshall's entry into the court. As already noted above,
Marshall the attorney lost his only case before the Court in
Ware v. Hylton.166 In this case, Marshall had supported the
rights of a Virginian businessman who owed prerevolutionary debts to British creditors. One of Marshall's
losing arguments was that Virginia, having prevailed over
the British in the Revolutionary War, was entitled to
extinguish debts its citizens owed British creditors. In his
concurring opinion, Justice Paterson noted:
Considering ... the usages of civilized nations, and the opinion of
modern writers, relative to confiscation, and also the
circumstances under which these debts were contracted ....
[W]e
ought to admit of no comment that will narrow and restrict their
operation and import. The construction of a treaty made in favor of
such creditors, and for the restoration and enforcement of preexisting contracts, ought to be liberal and benign.167

Justice Chase had been more emphatic
importance of creditor rights observing that

about

the

Congress had the power to sacrifice the rights and interests of
private citizens to secure the safety and prosperity of the public..
• [and as such] ample compensation ought to be made to all the
debtors who [were] injured by the treaty, for the benefit of the
public. 168

Thus, although there existed a doctrine of nonintercourse prohibiting commerce between belligerent
states, the strictness of this doctrine had begun to be
attenuated by the late eighteenth century.169 Some
165. Fried Krupp Aktiengesellschaft v. Orconera Iron Ore Co., (1919) 88
Eng. Rep. 304, 309 (Ch.).
166. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).

167.
168.
169.
decision

Id. at 255-56.
Id. at 245.
The strict application of this rule is demonstrated in a Supreme Court
from 1814, where Judge Johnson noted in part:
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commentators have dated the attenuation of this rule to
end the nineteenth century when it is said that "rapid
advances in civilization," "progressive public opinion," and
the "influence of Christianity" made it possible to
differentiate between military as opposed to civil affairs
170
and between the conduct of war and of commerce.
However, as the foregoing materials show, this rule was
already under steady erosion under rather dissimilar geopolitical and military circumstances for the United States a
century earlier. As the U.S. international legal jurist of that
period John Bassett Moore observed, attitudes favorable
towards commerce even during war were informed by "a
moral revolt" and a "new creed," a "loftier conception [of]
the destiny of and rights of man and of a more humane
spirit" according to which eliminating the confiscation of
property was necessary to "assure to the world's commerce
a legitimate and definite freedom. ' 171 Moore's justification
of the rule is a modernist emancipatory universalism, which
is argued to have prevailed over the barbarity of war and
similar dark forces in the interest of avoiding the adverse
consequences of war. 172
To conclude this discussion, I will go back to Justice
Marshall for a moment. Another of his significant decisions
in support of commerce in the face of the assertion of rights

The universal sense of nations has acknowledged the demoralizing
effects that would result from the admission of individual intercourse.
The whole nation are embarked in one common bottom, and must be
reconciled to submit to one common fate. Every individual of the one
nation must acknowledge every individual of the other nation as his
own enemy ....
The Rapid, 12 U.S. (8Cranch) 155, 161 (1814).

170. COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, THE EFFECT OF WAR ON CONTRACTS AND ON
TRADING ASSOCIATIONS IN TERRITORIES OF BELLIGERENTS (1909); see also ALBERT
0. HIRSCHMAN, RIVAL VIEWS OF MARKET SOCIETY AND OTHER RECENT ESSAYS 107
(1992) (noting William Robertson's assertion that "[c]ommerce ... softens and
polishes the manners of men," based off of Montesquieu's statement that
"wherever there is commerce, manners are gentle.").
171. JOHN BASSETT MOORE, INTERNATIONAL
ILLUSIONS AND OTHER ESSAYS 13-14 (1924).

LAW AND

SOME

CURRENT

172. For a similar exposition of the expunging of religion from international
law, see David Kennedy, Images of Religion in International Legal Theory, in
THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 137,

142-43 (Mark Janis ed., 1991).
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of prevailing belligerents is United States v. Percheman.173
Here Justice Marshall asserted that:
[t]he modern usage of nations, which has become law, would be
violated; that sense of justice and of right, which is
acknowledged and felt by the whole civilized world, would be
outraged; if private property should generally be confiscated
and private rights annulled, on a change in the sovereignty of
the country. The people change their allegiance . . . but their

relations to each other, and their rights of property remain
74
undisturbed. 1

Justice Marshall's viewpoint is also evidenced in his
criticisms of the decisions of the British Courts. He
attributed the breakdown of negotiations over British debts
'to the wild, extensive, and unreasonable construction"' of
Article VI of the Jay Treaty. 75 For example, although the
Jay Treaty defined "contraband" as anything that might
directly serve to equip a vessel, Marshall contended that
the British construction of the definition essentially ignored
"directly" by construing the term loosely. 176 Marshall also
expressed disgust at British courts' lack of respect for the
177
law by condoning illegal captures or denying damages.
Although Marshall respected Sir William Scott, Judge of
the British High Court of Admiralty, the former noted that
the decisions of the latter definitely favored the British and
did not support international law. According to Justice
Marshall, Sir Scott's jurisprudence seemed to have been
influenced by an unconscious bias of Great Britain's being a
173. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
174. Id. at 51. The government's position in the case is captured by the
following quote:
What, indeed, can be more clearly entitled to rank among things
favourable, than engagements between nations securing the private
property of faithful subjects, honestly acquired under a government
which is on the eve of relinquishing their allegiance, and confided to
the pledged protection of that country [sic] which is about to receive
them as citizens?
Id. at 68.
175. RUDKO, supra note 53, at 106 (citing Letter from John Marshall to
Rufus King (Sept. 20, 1800), in 4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 285 (Charles
T. Cullen ed., 1984)).
176. Id. at 106.
177. Id. at 107.
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"great maritime country."'178 In particular, Marshall took
issue with Sir Scott's decisions involving determination of
the domicile of a person whose property had been
confiscated by mere residence in a foreign country without
reference to what the person may have intended. 179 He also
critiqued his brethren in the Venus case for failing to
inquire into the intentions of such a person, a failure which
Marshall regarded as leading to the injustice of confiscating
the property of such a person by virtue of their mere
presence abroad.
Thus, throughout his career in the Supreme Court,
Justice Marshall consistently asserted the rights of those
involved in commercial activity against claims of the
superiority of rights of victorious belligerents. His
jurisprudence had a definite mark in solidifying commercial
rights when they came in tension with the privileges of
belligerents. Unsurprisingly, the Percheman decision was
cited in a South African court not long thereafter. 18 0 That
this jurisprudence had already become that far known at
the time is suggestive of the innovations of Justice Marshall
in carving out spaces for legitimate commerce at a time
when the assertion of the rights of belligerents was in the
ascendant. In addition, as a further testament to the
importance of Marshall's contribution to the law of prize,
which at the time was the most critical and pertinent
branch of international law, some commentators during
Marshall's time counted him amongst the leading
international jurists, including Sir William Scott, Robert
Joseph Pothier, and Cornelius Bynkershoek.18 ' Further, as
already noted, these liberal principles espoused by Justice
Marshall were about a century later to be enshrined in the
Hague Regulations of 1907.182 Yet, notwithstanding these
liberal rules of commercial relations that Justice Marshall
espoused, in Part III, I show how he played a central role in
justifying the power of conquest and discovery in the
deprivation of Indians of their territory and their equal

178. The Venus, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253, 299 (1814).
179. Id. at 316.
180. W. Rand Century Gold Mining Co. v. King, 2 K.B. 391 (1905).
181. RUDKO,supra note 53, at 72.

182. Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The
Hague, 18 Oct. 1907.
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status as nations with whom the emerging United States
could engage in commerce with complete reciprocity.
III. A DIFFERENT RULE FOR UNITED STATES/INDIAN
ECONOMIC RELATIONS

183

Just at the moment he was announcing the most liberal
rules for commerce between European nations and the early
United States, Justice Marshall was simultaneously
contributing to the emergence of a jurisprudence that5
strongly favored the view that conquest 8 4 and discovery18
give conquerors a legitimate title to the territory of native
Americans. In Johnson v. McIntosh, 8 6 the question was
whether two Indian chiefs had the power to pass on a valid
title to private individuals that was recognizable in the
Courts of the United States. 8 7 For Marshall, the question
at the end of the day was whether, after the assumption of
dominion over all the territory of the U.S. first by the
British Crown and subsequently by the United States,
Indians had any title over their territory to pass on. In
183. This part borrows heavily from James Thuo Gathii, Commerce,
Conquest and Wartime Confiscation, 31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 709 (2006)
184. In Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), Marshall held
that "[clonquest gives a title which Courts of the Conqueror cannot deny,
whatever the private and speculative opinions of individuals may be respecting
the ordinal justice of the claim which has been successfully asserted." Id. at 588.
185. According to Marshall,

[h]owever extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an
inhabited country into conquest may appear; if the principle has been
asserted in the first instance, and afterwards sustained; if a country
has been acquired and held under it; if the property of the great mass
of the community originates in it, it becomes the law of the land, and
cannot be questioned.
Id. at 591. In affirming this, Marshall further notes,
This opinion conforms precisely to the principle which has been
supposed to be recognised by all European governments, from the first
settlement of America. The absolute ultimate title has been considered
as acquired by discovery, subject only to the Indian title of occupancy,
which title the discoverers possessed the exclusive right of acquiring.
Such a right is no more incompatible with a seisin in fee, than a lease
for years, and might as effectually bar an ejectment.
Id. at 592; see also id. at 595.
186. Id.

187. Id. at 572.
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short, for Marshall the issue was whether "a title acquired
from the Indians18 8would be valid against a title acquired
from the Crown."
For Justice Marshall, the rule of decision in the case
had been necessitated by the desire to reduce interEuropean conflict over title to "this immense continent"
which he noted that the "great nations of Europe" sought
appropriate.1 8 9 This rule, he held, was the principle of
discovery, which was consummated by the possession of
territory by the subjects of respective European countries.
Such discovery in turn operated to prevent other European
states from claiming title to the discovered territory. 190
What of the Indians who occupied the territory? According
to Justice Marshall, the "exclusive right of the United
States to extinguish191their title, and to grant the soil" had
never been doubted.
Having recognized the title of the United States over
their land, Marshall concluded that this title was
incompatible with an "absolute and complete title in the
Indians."'192 It is at this point that Marshall then justified
the title of the United States on the basis of conquest.
According to Marshall, conquest gave valid title that the
"[c]ourts of the conqueror cannot deny," notwithstanding
questions about the "original justice" of the assertion of this
title. 193 Such a title acquired by conquest was maintainable
by force. 194
The reason the title was maintainable by force,
according to Justice Marshall, was because Indians were
"fierce savages, whose occupation was war, and whose
substance was drawn chiefly from the forest."'195 Marshall

188. Id. at 604.
189. Id. at 573.
190. Id.; see also id. at 584.
191. Id. at 586.
192. Id. at 588.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 589.

195. Id. at 590.
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therefore argued that it was necessary to enforce
European
19 6
claims to the land they occupied "by the sword."
Thus although he had spoken eloquently against the
rights of belligerents insofar as they undermined free
commerce in the United States' international relations with
its European counterparts, for Indians, war was the
solution for their subjugation. Marshall further endorsed
this subjugation by arguing that "European policy,
97
numbers, and skill, prevailed" over Indian aggression.
As Marshall's holding in Johnson v. McIntosh
illustrates, the Supreme Court endorsed the power of
belligerent confiscation not simply out of a belligerent's
absolute power but rather out of the presumed
backwardness of those whose territory or property had been
seized by virtue of the proclaimed superiority of Europeans
over these peoples. It was because Indians were so different
that he held the law thht applies as between conqueror and
conquered was inapplicable to them and, instead, a "new
and different rule, better adapted to the actual state of
things was unavoidable."1 9 8 This, according to Justice
196. Id. Marshall claimed that the Indians were incapable of legally owning
the land and that they merely possessed it and, as such, could not pass on valid
title to the White population. Marshall claimed that the Indians were merely
the ancient inhabitants of the land and that the territory was held by the
British Crown prior to its occupation by White settlers. Id. at 591.
197. Id. at 590. Note also his justification of the doctrine of discovery in the
later case of Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 543-44 (1832):
After lying concealed for a series of ages, the enterprise of Europe,
guided by nautical science, conducted some of her adventurous sons
into this western world. They found it in possession of a people who
had made small progress in agriculture or manufactures, and whose
general employment was war, hunting and fishing .

. [D]iscovery

. .

gave title to the government by whose subjects or by whose authority it
was made, against all other European governments, which title might
be consummated by possession.
198. Id at 591. This basis of this doctrine of the supremacy of Europeans
over non-Europeans in the common law finds expression in the landmark 1602
Calvin's Case where Lord Coke noted:
And upon this ground there is a diversity between a conquest of a
kingdom of a Christian King, and the conquest of a kingdom of an
infidel; for if a King come to a Christian kingdom by conquest, seeing
that he hath vitce et necis potestatem, he may at his pleasure alter and
change the laws of that kingdom: but until be doth make an alteration
of those laws the ancient laws of that kingdom remain ....

But if a

Christian King should conquer a kingdom of an infidel, and bring them
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Marshall, was the rule of discovery under which Indians
were recognized as mere occupants of their land.
In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,199 Justice Marshall
announced that the relation of Indians to the United States
was that of "a ward to his guardian." 200 Indians, according
to Marshall, were essentially like children in relation to the
United States rather than sovereign nations. As such, they
were obliged to look to the U.S. government for protection,
kindness and power as well as to seek out its help in
fulfilling their needs. 201 Furthermore, rather then
proceeding to give the Cherokees protection from their
forcible eviction from Georgia onto the deadly Trail of Tears
that ensued, Justice Marshall declared that even if the
Cherokee Nation had rights they could assert, the Supreme
Court was "not the tribunal which can redress the past or
prevent the future. ' 202 On his part, Justice Johnson
regarded the forcible exertion of authority over the
Cherokees by the State of Georgia as not only legally
permissible but as "a contest for empire." 203 By contrast,
Justice Thompson's dissent would have recognized the
sovereignty of the Cherokee Nation and allowed them
jurisdiction to enjoin the State
of Georgia from forcibly
20 4
evicting them from their lands.
Finally, in Worcester v Georgia,20 5 Justice Marshall
affirmed the doctrine of discovery and further justified the
subjugation of Indians on the unsuccessful attempts the
United States had made in negotiating and regulating trade

under his subjection, there ipso facto the laws of the infidel are
abrogated, for that they be not only against Christianity, but against
the law of God and of nature, contained in the decalogue ....
Calvin v. Smith, (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 397-98 (K.B.).
199. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
200. See id.
201. See id. For a further exploration of this theme, see James Gathii,
Colonialism, Imperialism and InternationalLaw, 54 BUFF. L. REV. (forthcoming
Jan. 2007).
202. Id. at 20.
203. Id. at 29.
204. See id. at 50-80 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
205. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), superseded by statute, 43 U.S.C. § 666
(2000).
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with them. 206 According to Marshall, war was necessary to
deal with the Indians since regular commercial contact
could not be established with them. 20 7 In any event, we
know that Marshall had already concluded the Indians
were incapable of being integrated into the United States
and that 208
relations with them were that of a ward and its
guardian.
Marshall's jurisprudence sounds eerily similar to
sixteenth century jurist Francisco de Vitoria's justification
of the Spanish conquest of the Indians. Vitoria justified as
lawful the killing of Indians in the course of Spanish
colonization noting that this is '"especially the case against
the unbeliever, from whom it is useless ever to hope for a
just peace on any terms."' 209 War and the destruction of all

206. Id. at 558.
207. Id. In a groundbreaking analysis of the writings of Vitoria, the
sixteenth century international legal jurist credited with being one of the
founders of international law, Antony Anghie shows that while Vitoria
exhibited a progressive approach to dealing with the Indians by arguing in
favor of incorporating them within the universal law of jus gentium, their
incorporation into this universal law, in turn, served as the basis for justifying
the imposition of Spanish "discipline" on them. Vitoria argued that since the
Indians were resisting the right of the Spanish to sojourn on their territory, the
Spanish were entitled to use forcible means to enforce this right. In addition,
Vitoria argued that the ordinary prohibitions of waging war do not apply to
Indians. See Antony Anghie, Franciscode Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of
InternationalLaw, 5 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 321, 331 (1996). In Vitoria's words:
And so when a war is at that pass that the indiscriminate spoliation of
all enemy-subjects alike and the seizure of all their goods are
justifiable, then it is also justifiable to carry all enemy subjects off into
captivity, whether they be guilty or guiltless. And inasmuch as war
with pagans is of this type, seeing that it is perpetual and that they can
never make amends for the wrongs and damages they have wrought, it
is indubitably lawful to carry off both the children and women of the
Saracens into captivity and slavery.
Id. at 330.
208. For further analysis, see Robert A. Williams, The Algebra of Federal
Indian Law: The Hard Trial of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White
Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219, 246, which argues that
under this Eurocentric jurisprudence, conquest was thought necessary to bring
"the infidels and savages of America 'to human civility,' and to a settled and
quiet Government." Id.
209. Anghie, supra note 207, at 330 (quoting Franciscus De Victoria, De
Indis Relectio Posterior, sive De Iure Belli Hispanorum in Barbaros, in THE
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 163, 163 (photo. reprint 1994) (Ernest Nys ed.,
John Pawley Bate trans., Carnegie Inst. Wash. 1917) (1557).
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the Indians who could bear arms against the invading
Spanish conquerors-or in contravention of the right of the
the only
Spanish to sojourn on Indian territory-was
210
remedy available to the Spaniards.
Like with Vitoria, the racial charge in Justice
Marshall's jurisprudence with respect to non-Christian and
non-European peoples is strikingly evident. This is
radically different from the jurisprudence of neutrality that
Justice Marshall helped crystallize in relations between the
United States and its European counterparts. In effect, one
could surmise from our discussion from Part II above that
the Marshall Court espoused and helped consolidate two
very different legal regimes of international commercial
governance. On the one hand, there was the regime of
liberal commerce he promoted against the countervailing
rights of belligerents, and on the other hand, there was the
illiberal regime of conquest and subjugation that he helped
establish in U.S.-Indian relations.
Marshall's federal Indian law jurisprudence arose in
the encounter between metropolitan policy and the
resistance of non-Europeans against colonization. 21 1 As
Laura Benton has argued, the expansion of metropolitan
authority over colonial peoples produced predictable
"routines for incorporating groups with separate legal
identities in production and trade and for accommodating
(or changing) culturally diverse ways of viewing the
regulation and exchange of property. '212 The Marshall
solution for ordering these relations with the Indians was
"Christian subjugation and remediation." 213 By contrast,
Marshall announced the most liberal rules in relations
between the weak maritime United States of the late
eighteenth century. Ordering the economic relations of the

210. Similarly, Robert A. Williams argues that under this Eurocentric
jurisprudence, conquest was thought necessary to "bring the infidels and
savages of America to human civility, and to a settled and quiet Government."
Williams, supra note 208, at 246.
211. Here I am heavily influenced by LAUREN BENTON, LAW AND COLONIAL
at 4-5 (2002).

CULTURES: LEGAL REGIMES IN WORLD HISTORY, 1400-1900,

212. Id. at 5.
213. Williams, supra note 208, at 247.
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late eighteenth century United States was thus ultimately
214
a question of power.
CONCLUSION

The demand for rules of liberal commerce is often
traced to market forces or population growth. 215 This
market-oriented or, "Smithian," and demographic account
of the rise of liberal rules of international commerce,
however, understate the importance of military and
economic weakness as factors in the development and
consolidation of liberal rules of commerce. The rules of
neutrality that the Marshall court promoted in the face of
depredations of U.S. commerce were eventually recognized
in the 1907 Hague Regulations. 216 These regulations
and private property safe
overwhelmingly give commerce
217
passage during wartime.
Today, this legacy of unequal regimes in international
economic governance largely remains intact. Reciprocity
between western industrialized countries has largely been
achieved. However, a non-reciprocal regime remains
embedded with the international economic order in
relations between western industrialized economies and
contemporary developing economies, which largely remain
agrarian. For example, for about the last five or so decades
there has been more or less full reciprocity of the
industrialized products of western economies within the
international trade regime established under the aegis of
GATT in 1948,218 while within the same time period there

214. Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the
Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 675 (1989) similarly argues that the

issues of power and jurisdiction dominate federal courts' jurisprudence.
215. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990); DOUGLASS C. NORTH & ROBERT PAUL THOMAS,
THE RISE OF THE WESTERN WORLD: A NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY (1973). But see
Robert Brenner, The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of NeoSmithian Marxism, 104 NEW LEFT REV. 25, 58 (1977).
216. See supra note 182.

217. See Berg v. British & African Steam Navigation Co. (The S.S. Appam),
243 U.S. 124, 150-51 (1917).

218. For a further exploration of this theme, see James Thuo Gathii, Process
and Substance in WTO Reform, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 885 (2004); see also The
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has been no full reciprocity for the agricultural products of
developing countries in western markets within this
regime.
This account of the relevance of military and economic
power or lack thereof leads to the following crucial insight
of this Essay. Economically and militarily weak countries
are very likely to seek the promotion and protection of
international legal norms to safeguard their commercial
rights from violation and abuse from more economically and
militarily powerful countries. In essence, weaker countries
have big incentives to persuade more powerful countries to
build and to play by some common rules that are beneficial
to all countries whether rich or poor or militarily powerful
or not. While there is an already established literature
demonstrating the incentives of economically prosperous
countries promoting, shaping, and imposing their preferred
norms of international economic behavior on less
prosperous nations, 219 I hope this Essay has served to
illustrate that it is in the interests of less prosperous
nations to promote the promulgation of rules of
international economic governance beneficial to all States.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, (Oct. 30, 1947) T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 194.
219. This is of course not to suggest that militarily and economically
powerful countries have no incentive to develop or comply with international
legal norms. See JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER: WHY
THE WORLD'S ONLY SUPERPOWER CAN'T Go IT ALONE 17 (2002).

